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BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY WITH A 
COMMUNITY’S RIGHT-TO-KNOW: 
MAINTAINING PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION 
THROUGH EPCRA’S NON-PREEMPTION 
CLAUSE 
Katherine Chekouras*
Abstract: Over the past decade, public information regarding potential 
environmental hazards has been restricted due to national security con-
cerns over terrorism. Citizens across the country are now hampered in 
their ability to assess the danger of local chemical facilities—and take 
proper precautionary measures—due to changing laws that limit or 
deny access to information about these facilities. This Note explains 
how states can enhance access to public environmental information 
while respecting legitimate security concerns. By decreasing reporting 
thresholds and making information accessible on the internet, states 
can strike a more proper balance between security concerns and a com-
munity’s right to know about chemical and environmental dangers. This 
Note discusses this balance, and suggests that information regarding 
chemical plant facilities should remain public because it poses a low se-
curity risk and offers a high public beneªt. 
Introduction 
 Federal government actions such as raising the threshold for the 
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) and passing the Critical Infrastructure 
Information Act of 2002 (CIIA) are criticized for allowing private sec-
tor chemical facilities to restrict the dissemination of safety and envi-
ronmental information to the local community. Proposed changes to 
raise the threshold reporting requirements for the TRI have been de-
scribed as putting “the interests of chemical facilities squarely in front 
of the families in the community.”1 Similarly, the CIIA is portrayed as 
                                                                                                                      
 
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2006–07. 
1 Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 211, 116 Stat. 
2135 (2002) (codiªed at 6 U.S.C. § 131); Letter from Katy Sorenson, Miami-Dade Bd. of 
County Comm’rs, to Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Dec. 12, 2005) 
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overly broad, and protecting business interests rather than national 
security.2 However, amendments restricting public access to off-site 
consequence analysis data addressed security concerns voiced by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation prior to the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, as well as George W. Bush’s election.3
 As the varying opinions on recent amendments and proposed 
regulations demonstrate, balancing legitimate national security con-
cerns and a tradition of public disclosure of local environmental in-
formation is a complex issue that creates tension between national 
and local interests. This Note seeks to unravel a few of these com-
plexities and address how states may protect and enhance communi-
cation about toxins by enacting state legislation that supplements the 
federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EP-
CRA), though in a manner that does not conºict with national secu-
rity legislation.4
 Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the preemption 
doctrine. Many federal environmental statutes originally evolved from 
state legislation, with commentators arguing both for and against fed-
                                                                                                                      
(public comment for Toxics Release Inventory Burden Reduction Proposed Rule), avail-
able at http://www.ombwatch.org/tricenter/MiamiDadeCountyComments.pdf. See generally 
Toxics Release Inventory Burden Reduction, 70 Fed. Reg. 57,822 (proposed Oct. 4, 2005) 
(to be codiªed at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372); OMB Watch, State, Local Ofªcials Try to Halt Federal TRI 
Cutbacks, 7 OMB Watch 3 (Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://www.ombwatch.org/article/ 
articleview/3275/1/420. 
2 See Christina E. Wells, “National Security” Information and the Freedom of Information Act, 
56 Admin. L. Rev. 1195, 1215–16 (2004); Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The Freedom of 
Information Act Post 9/11: Balancing the Public’s Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
and Homeland Security, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 261, 295–97 (2003). But see Nicholas Bagley, 
Benchmarking, Critical Infrastructure Security, and the Regulatory War on Terror, 43 Harv. J. on 
Legis. 47, 56–57 (2006) (arguing that the Critical Information Infrastructure Act (CIIA) is 
not the “black hole” it is often described as, and noting that only thirty-one ªrms submit-
ted CIIA information to the Department of Homeland Security during the ªrst ten months 
of data collection). In the United States, it is estimated that approximately eighty-ªve per-
cent of critical infrastructure is privately held. Procedures for Handling Critical Informa-
tion, 71 Fed. Reg. 52,252 (Sept. 1, 2006) (ªnal rule for 6 C.F.R. pt. 29) [hereinafter Proce-
dures for Handling CII]; Bagley, supra, at 49. The Department of Homeland Security 
believes that after the recent promulgation of the ªnal rule, a larger number of private 
companies will submit information. Procedures for Handling CII, 71 Fed. Reg. at 52,270. 
3 Accidental Release Prevention Requirements; Risk Management Programs Under 
the Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(7); Distribution of Off-Site Consequence Analysis Infor-
mation, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,834, 24,835 (Apr. 27, 2000) [hereinafter OCA Data]. 
4 This Note does not address nuclear power plants or the economics of disclosing in-
formation. 
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eral preemption of environmental laws.5 Recent federal legislation 
may preempt states’ attempts to create community right-to-know laws. 
 Part II surveys how national security concerns have inºuenced 
federal legislation. It discusses the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
and its exemptions to provide an overview of some of the deªned in-
stances that have limited a tradition of public disclosure. Additionally, 
the section examines a series of recent amendments to federal legisla-
tion. Each statute discussed has revised public access to environ-
mental information due to a national security concern. For example, 
recent Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) amendments addressed se-
curity concerns by requiring facilities to conduct vulnerability assess-
ments. 
 Part III describes EPCRA, identiªes what information is publicly 
available, and explains why state legislation is not preempted. Part IV 
provides an analysis of the risk of a chemical attack followed by a de-
scription of the role of environmental information in public partici-
pation, as well as a discussion of the various types of disclosure. Parts 
V and VI identify existing state right-to-know laws and explain where 
state laws supplementing EPCRA may be preempted by federal na-
tional security legislation. Part VII examines past federal and state 
laws, information concerning the risk of a chemical attack, and the 
need for public participation to suggest manners of balancing na-
tional security concerns with the public’s right-to-know. This Note ad-
vocates that state right-to-know legislation can avoid the potential im-
plications of higher TRI thresholds, respect legitimate national 
security concerns, and avoid federal preemption by critically assessing 
what information is publicly disclosed. 
I. Preemption Doctrine 
 The United States Constitution creates a hierarchical structure, 
which establishes federal law as the highest law in the country.6 The 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution states that the 
“Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
                                                                                                                      
5 See Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codiªed at 6 
U.S.C. § 101); Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act, 
Pub. L. No. 106-40, 113 Stat. 207 (1999) (codiªed at 42 U.S.C. § 7401); Jonathan H. Adler, 
Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 377, 
385–87 (2005); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice 
Analysis, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 641 (2001) (listing state leadership in a variety of laws on 
page 639). 
6 See U.S. Const. art. VI, amend. X. 
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in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land.”7 However, the Tenth Amendment retains signiªcant pow-
ers for the states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”8
 Under the Supremacy Clause, the federal government is able to 
preempt state law, but the powers of the states should remain uncon-
strained unless there is a clear indication of preemption.9 A clear in-
dication is necessary because the Tenth Amendment creates a gov-
ernmental structure in which “states have vast residual powers.”10 The 
interaction between the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment 
permits federal and state laws to simultaneously regulate the same 
ªeld.11
 There is an assumption in areas traditionally dominated by state 
legislation that the powers of the state should not be superseded by 
the federal government without Congress expressing a clear and 
manifest purpose to preempt.12 For example, the historic police pow-
ers of the states should not be superseded by a federal act without ei-
ther an explicit statement by Congress or an implied preemption 
through an act’s structure and purpose.13 However, this assumption 
regarding preemption is not present when the state regulates an area 
that has historically been the subject of federal legislation.14 Federal 
agencies acting within their congressionally delegated powers can 
preempt state regulation and render state regulations unenforce-
able.15 Preemption is applicable to state laws and regulations; it is 
generally not applicable to contracts and other voluntary agreements.16
                                                                                                                      
7 Id. art. VI. 
8 Id. amend. X. 
9 Id. art. VI; see U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). 
10 U.S. Const. amend. X; Locke, 529 U.S. at 109. 
11 See Locke, 529 U.S. at 109; see Nw. Cent. Pipeline v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 
U.S. 493, 494–95 (1989). 
12 Locke, 529 U.S. at 108; Ray v. Atl. Richªeld Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978). 
13 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
14 See Locke, 529 U.S. at 108 (summarizing the opinion from Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)). 
15 Id. at 110; City of New York v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988). 
16 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 526–27 (1992); Ass’n of Int’l 
Auto. Mfrs. v. Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 208 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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 There are three ways in which the federal government can pre-
empt state statutes and regulations.17 First, a state statute can be pre-
empted through an explicit statement by a federal act indicating pre-
emption.18 Absent such an explicit statement, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has applied conºict preemption and ªeld preemption princi-
ples to evaluate whether a state regulation or statute is preempted.19 
Conºict preemption occurs when either: (1) it is physically impossible 
to comply with both the state and federal law; or (2) the state law 
serves as a barrier or obstacle to accomplishing the purpose of the 
federal law.20 Field preemption is applicable when the federal scheme 
“is ‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress 
left no room for the States to supplement it.’”21
 Under ªeld preemption, determining whether a state statute is 
consistent with a federal scheme requires examining the structure 
and purpose of the federal act.22 The structure and purpose of the 
federal act may indicate that Congress intended only one set of regu-
lations.23 If only one set of regulations was implied, then any addi-
tional requirements by a state would be interpreted as impeding the 
federal purpose of a uniform regulatory scheme.24 For example, in 
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided that while certain provisions of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (OSHA) could indicate that similar state laws requiring 
additional training for employees handling hazardous waste were ac-
ceptable, the overall structure evidenced congressional intent to avoid 
duplicate regulations.25 Because the overall structure indicated that 
duplicate regulations were against the purpose of the act, the state law 
was preempted.26
 Congress may attempt to remove ambiguities concerning pre-
emption by including either a non-preemption or a savings clause.27 A 
                                                                                                                      
17 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98; Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 
2000). 
18 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. 
19 Id. 
20 See Locke, 529 U.S. at 109; Gade, 505 U.S. at 98; Ray v. Atl. Richªeld Co., 435 U.S. 151, 
157–58 (1978). 
21 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 
(1947)). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 98–99. 
24 Id. at 98–100. 
25 Id. at 99–100. 
26 Id. at 102. 
27 See Gade, 505 U.S. at 100. 
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non-preemption clause indicates that state and federal law are not 
mutually exclusive.28 When federal and state laws are not mutually 
exclusive, the federal law may be viewed as a minimum standard, 
which states may then supplement by imposing more stringent stan-
dards.29 A savings clause indicates a speciªc segment of state legisla-
tion that should not be preempted by the federal act.30 The OSHA 
savings clause, for example, states: “Nothing in this chapter shall pre-
vent any State agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under State 
law over any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which 
no standard is in effect . . . .”31 Savings clauses have been interpreted 
as presupposing a background preemption of all state legislation on 
the same topic as the federal legislation.32 The above OSHA savings 
clause was interpreted in Gade as indicating federal preemption of all 
state occupational safety and health standards without federal ap-
proval as outlined in OSHA.33
II. Access to Environmental Information: The Impact of 
National Security Concerns on Speciªc Federal Acts 
A. An Overview of Access to Information: Freedom of Information Act 
 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) has been described as 
establishing the principle that all government records should be pub-
licly available.34 Though the Act contains a number of exemptions, 
only four of those exemptions are likely related to data reporting for 
chemical facilities due to national security concerns: preclusion by 
other laws, national security, law enforcement, and well data.35 The 
ªrst is a blanket exemption for all documents excluded from FOIA by 
other statutes.36 Statutes exempting information must “leave no discre-
tion on the issue” and “establish particular criteria for withholding or 
                                                                                                                      
28 Id. 
29 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 391–92 
(2d ed. 2002). 
30 See Gade, 505 U.S. at 100. 
31 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2000). 
32 See Gade, 505 U.S. at 100. 
33 Id. at 99–100. 
34 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000); James W. Conrad, Protecting Private Security-Related Informa-
tion from Disclosure by Government Agencies, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 715, 721 (2005). 
35 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
36 Id. § 552(b)(3). 
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refer to particular types of matters to be withheld.”37 An example of 
this type of exemption is the CIIA.38
 The second exemption is applicable to national security and ap-
plies to documents classiªed pursuant to an executive order for rea-
sons of national security or foreign policy.39 The third exemption is 
for records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes 
when production or distribution of such information could “reasona-
bly be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individ-
ual.”40 The fourth exemption is applicable to wells, and allows for in-
formation concerning geological and geophysical data—including 
maps of wells—to be excluded from FOIA.41
B. Limiting Access: The Clean Air Act and the Chemical Safety Information, 
Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act 
 The Clean Air Act (CAA) incorporates a reporting requirement 
for stationary sources that emit chemicals.42 The chemicals covered 
include at least 100 substances that are “known to cause . . . death, 
injury, or serious adverse effects to human health or the environ-
ment.”43 This list includes vinyl chloride and ªfteen other substances 
identiªed by Congress, and it currently includes seventy-seven toxic 
substances and sixty-three ºammable substances.44
 Under CAA section 112(r), stationary sources must report a risk 
management plan (RMP) to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) that contains an Off-Site Consequence Analysis (OCA).45 The 
RMP provides an assessment of the potential effects resulting from an 
accidental release of a hazardous chemical.46 The RMP includes the 
                                                                                                                      
37 Id. 
38 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2003); see infra Part II.C. 
39 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). This is considered a limited exemption because not all agen-
cies have the authority to classify information. Conrad, supra note 34, at 724–26. Also, it 
can be inhibitive for everyday use of the information because of the necessary security 
clearances and procedures for maintaining document security. Id. However, recent news 
demonstrates the current administration’s desire to utilize the clause to reclassify docu-
ments in the Library of Congress. See Scott Shane, U.S. Reclassiªes Many Documents in Secret 
Review, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 2006, at A1, A16. 
40 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). 
41 Id. § 552(b)(9). 
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (2000) (“‘Stationary sources’ means any buildings, struc-
tures, equipment, installations, or substance emitting stationary activities.”) 
43 Id. § 7412(r)(3). 
44 Id. § 7412(r)(D)(3); 40 C.F.R. § 68.130 (2005). 
45 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(B)–(H). 
46 Id. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(ii)(I). 
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previous release history for the past ªve years, an accidental release 
prevention program, and a response program for protecting human 
health and the environment in the case of an accident.47
 The RMP’s OCA summarizes the worst case scenario for a facil-
ity.48 In some cases, it describes a more likely scenario, referred to as 
an “alternative release scenario.”49 The conditions necessary to pro-
duce a worst case scenario are noted in the OCA, an example of 
which might be a ªre on a windy day.50 The OCA also describes the 
vulnerability zone—the area potentially impacted by a worst case sce-
nario—including the total population, public receptors, and environ-
mental receptors that would be affected.51
 Section 112(r) of the CAA mandates that the RMP be available to 
the public and submitted to the state and any local agency responsible 
for responding to an accidental release.52 The RMP, with OCA data 
removed, was previously available on the internet.53 After the passage 
of the Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regula-
tory Relief Act in 1999 (CSISSFRRA),54 EPA pulled the information 
from the internet and implemented new public access regulations.55
 The CSISSFRRA and its corresponding regulations limited public 
access to OCA data in order to balance national security concerns and 
                                                                                                                      
47 Id. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(ii). Every RMP contains an executive summary that states the 
stationary source and regulated chemical(s), the general accidental release prevention 
program, chemical-speciªc prevention steps, the ªve-year accident history, the emergency 
response program, and planned changes to safety. 40 C.F.R. § 69.155 (2005). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 7412(H)(i)(III); 40 C.F.R. § 68.25; Joseph D. Jacobson, Safeguarding Na-
tional Security Through Public Release of Environmental Information: Moving the Debate to the Next 
Level, 9 Envtl. Law. 327, 356–59 (2003) (outlining the complete regulations pertaining to 
three different program levels and what each level must submit). 
49 42 U.S.C. § 7412(H)(i)(III); 40 C.F.R. § 68.28; Jacobson, supra note 48, at 359. 
50 40 C.F.R. § 68.165. 
51 Id.; Accidental Release Prevention Requirements; Risk Management Programs Un-
der the Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(7); Distribution of Off-Site Consequence Analysis 
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,108, 48,127–28 (Aug. 4, 2000) [hereinafter OCA Data II]. 
52 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(iii). 
53 See OCA Data, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,834, 24,835 (Apr. 27, 2000); Jessica Barkas, Nuking 
Freedom of Information and Community Right to Know: How Post-9/11 Secrecy Could Make America 
Less Safe, 28 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 199, 207 (2005); Jacobson, supra note 48, at 
360–61 (explaining that OCA data was never posted on the internet); Stephen M. John-
son, Terrorism, Security, and Environmental Protection, 29 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y 
Rev. 107, 118 (2004). 
54 Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act, Pub. L. 
No. 106-40, 113 Stat. 207 (1999) (codiªed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7412). 
55 Id.; Jacobson, supra note 48, at 361–63. 
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the public’s right-to-know.56 The regulations allow a paper copy of the 
OCA data to be available to the public in at least ªfty designated read-
ing rooms located throughout the United States and its territories.57 
Any person can read the reports in these rooms, but they may not re-
move the report or make a mechanical copy.58 One reason for limit-
ing taking notes to non-mechanical copies is that technological ad-
vances, such as copy machines and digital cameras, have increased the 
risk that the reports will be reproduced and posted on the internet, 
thus undermining the government’s attempts to limit the dissemina-
tion of OCA information.59
 Identiªcation is required in order to obtain access to the records, 
and individuals may not access more than ten OCAs per month.60 These 
requirements increase the personal contact necessary to obtain the data, 
and therefore decrease the risk of illicit use.61 Between 1999 and 2002, 
only thirty-three persons in total visited these reading rooms.62 While 
limiting the public’s access to paper copies, the new regulations allow 
citizens to determine whether a location is part of a vulnerability zone 
through an internet request.63 EPA currently uses a computer-based 
indicator, Vulnerable Zone Indicator System (VZIS), to process the 
requests.64 The EPA’s VZIS website instructs users to type in their elec-
tronic mail address and the location in question’s address or longi-
tude and latitude.65 Users entering a location that may be within a 
vulnerability area are notiªed via electronic mail and provided with 
                                                                                                                      
56 40 C.F.R. § 1400.3, 1400.6 (2005); OCA Data II, 65 Fed. Reg. at 48,109; Dep’t of 
Justice, Assessment of the Increased Risk of Terrorist or Other Criminal Activ-
ity Associated with Posting Off-Site Consequence Analysis Information on the 
Internet 1 (2000) [hereinafter Dep’t of Justice]. 
57 40 C.F.R. § 1400.3. 
58 Id. Handwritten notes are allowed. See id. 
59 See Dep’t of Justice, supra note 56, at 46. 
60 40 C.F.R. § 1400.3. Personal information should be kept by the government for no 
longer than three years. Id. 
61 See Dep’t of Justice, supra note 56, at 4, 43. 
62 Thomas C. Beierle, Environmental Information Disclosure: Three Cases of Policy and Poli-
tics 14 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 03-16, March 2003), available at www.rff.org/ 
Documents/RFF-DP-03-16.pdf. 
63 40 C.F.R. § 1400.4. 
64 Id.; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Pre-
vention, Vulnerable Zone Indicator System, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oswer/CeppoWeb.nsf/ 
frmVZIS?OpenForm [hereinafter VZIS]. 
65 See VZIS, supra note 64. The same information can be requested via telephone or 
mail. 40 C.F.R. § 1400.4. 
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suggestions on how to obtain more information.66 Suggested manners 
for obtaining more information include visiting the reading room 
and obtaining OCA data, contacting the Local Emergency Planning 
Committee, searching RMP data on EPA’s website, and viewing other 
information on EPA’s website.67 The locations or identity of the indi-
vidual stationary sources creating the risk is not provided, nor is any 
additional information concerning health effects or the range of the 
vulnerability zone.68
C. Limited Access to Infrastructure Information: The Critical  
Infrastructure Information Act 
 The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (CIIA) was 
part of the Homeland Security Act.69 CIIA covers information “not 
customarily in the public domain and related to the security of critical 
infrastructure or protected systems.”70 The phrase “in the public do-
main” was recently deªned as “information lawfully, properly and 
regularly disclosed generally or broadly to the public.”71 Examples of 
this information include the ability of a system to resist a potential 
attack, the misuse of data communications, and any past operational 
problems regarding the system including repairs or reconstruction.72 
The purpose of CIIA is to gather critical infrastructure information in 
order to foster an understanding of security risks and prevent, or re-
cover from, interferences in the system.73
                                                                                                                      
66 40 C.F.R. § 1400.4; e-mail from Jacob Noble, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Ofªce, to Katherine Chekouras (March 
2, 2006, 11:18:21 EST) (on ªle with author). Author entered addresses on two separate occa-
sions. One received a response that the location is “likely to be in a vulnerability zone of a 
potential accidental release” and the other did not receive a response. Id. 
67 See Noble, supra note 66. Hyperlinks to the websites were provided in the e-mail. Id. 
Many Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC) do not obtain copies of risk manage-
ment plans (RMP) or will not release Offsite Consequence Analysis (OCA) and RMP data 
because of the potential penalty for improper disclosure to the public. National Institute 
for Chemical Studies, Local Emergency Planning Committees and Risk Management 
Plans: Encouraging Hazard Reduction 19, 21 ( June 2001), available at http://www. 
nicsinfo.org/LEPCStudyFinalReport.pdf. Public requests for RMPs from LEPCs that do not 
maintain the full document on ªle are directed to the facility. Id. at 19. 
68 See Noble, supra note 66. 
69 Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codiªed at 6 
U.S.C. § 101). 
70 6 U.S.C. § 131(3) (2000 & Supp. 2003). 
71 Procedures for Handling CII, 71 Fed. Reg. 52,252, 52,272 (Sept. 1, 2006) (ªnal rule 
for 6 C.F.R. pt. 29). 
72 6 U.S.C. § 131. 
73 Id. § 131(5); Wells, supra note 2, at 1213. 
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 The CIIA covers critical infrastructure information voluntarily 
submitted to certain federal agencies for security reasons or “other 
informational purpose[s].”74 This information is exempt from FOIA, 
and it cannot be used by any federal, state, or local authority, or a third 
party in a civil lawsuit without written consent.75 CIIA states that if the 
information is given to a state or local government entity, it cannot be 
made available under local laws requiring disclosure, or used for pur-
poses other than critical infrastructure.76 However, CIIA does provide 
that critical infrastructure information can be obtained by state, local, 
and federal government through other applicable laws including those 
that disclose the information generally or broadly to the public.77
D. A Possible Balance for Information Access: The Safe Drinking Water Act 
 The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Re-
sponse Act of 200278 addressed security concerns for water systems by 
making several amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).79 
The amendments required community water systems serving more 
than 3300 persons to conduct an assessment of the systems’ vulner-
ability to terrorist attacks or other intentional acts that would disrupt 
service.80 The vulnerability assessment includes, at the minimum, a 
review of pipes and physical barriers as well as treatment, storage, and 
computer systems.81 Community water systems must submit the vul-
                                                                                                                      
74 See 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1). 
75 Id. The information can, under certain conditions, be disclosed without written con-
sent to aid in a criminal prosecution, or for use by a House of Congress or the Comptroller 
General. Id. 
76 Id. § 133(a)(1)(E). 
77 Id. § 133(a)(2)(c). This notion is also supported by the rulemaking for CIIA’s corre-
sponding regulations, which state that the rule “does not impose any regulation that has 
substantial direct effects on the States . . . or the distribution of power and responsibilities 
among the various levels of government.” Procedures for Handling CII, 71 Fed. Reg. 
52,252, 52,271 (Sept. 1, 2006) (ªnal rule for 6 C.F.R. pt. 29). 
78 Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002) (codiªed at 42 U.S.C. § 201). 
79 Id. §§ 401–403 (codiªed at 42 U.S.C. § 300i); Varu Chilakamarri, Note, A New In-
strument in National Security: The Legislative Attempt to Combat Terrorism Via the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 91 Geo. L.J. 927, 927 (2003). 
80 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2(a)(1). The act is expected to cover approximately 2000 RMP facili-
ties. U.S. General Accounting Ofªce, Homeland Security: Federal Action Needed to 
Address Security Challenges at Chemical Facilities 6 n.3 (2004) (statement of John B. 
Stephenson, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, to the Subcomittee on National 
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Reform), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04482t.pdf [hereinafter 
Homeland Security]. 
81 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2(a)(1). 
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nerability assessment to EPA and create an emergency response plan 
addressing the vulnerabilities identiªed in the assessment.82 The emer-
gency response plan does not need to be submitted directly to EPA, 
but the community water system should coordinate with the Local 
Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs).83
 Vulnerability assessments are protected from disclosure to state, 
regional, or local governments and are exempted from FOIA.84 The 
amendments may preempt any state or local legislation which seeks to 
create access to the reports because SDWA states that “[n]o commu-
nity water system shall be required under State or local law to provide 
an assessment.”85
 While exempting vulnerability assessment information from pub-
lic disclosure, the SDWA also requires contamination reporting to the 
public.86 The public notice requirement mandates that a consumer 
conªdence report be distributed to customers of the drinking water 
supply.87 The report outlines whether the results exceeded the maxi-
mum contaminant level goal, and whether any variances or excep-
tions were granted.88 The report must also state in “plain language” 
the health concerns resulting from any regulated chemical that ex-
ceeded the maximum contaminant level that year.89
III. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
 The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(EPCRA) of 1986 was created with the purpose of providing commu-
nities with information concerning potential chemical hazards and 
facilitating emergency preparedness at the state and local levels.90 
Subchapter I of EPCRA creates State Emergency Response Commis-
sions (SERCs), Emergency Planning Districts, and Local Emergency 
                                                                                                                      
82 Id. § 300i-2(a), (b). 
83 Id. § 300i-2(b); Chilakamarri, supra note 79, at 935. 
84 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2(a)(3). The regulated entities include chemical facilities. Home-
land Security, supra note 80, at 4. Similarly, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 
2002 requires vulnerability assessments for facilities adjacent to waters subject to U.S. juris-
diction. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70101–03. These assessments, along with facility security plans au-
thorized under the chapter, are exempt from public disclosure. 46 U.S.C. § 70103. 
85 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2(a)(4). 
86 Id. §§ 300i-2(a)(3), 300g-3(c)(4). 
87 Id. § 300g-3(c)(4). 
88 Id. § 300g-3(c)(4)(B). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. § 11001; Am. Chem. Council v. Johnson, 406 F.3d 738, 739 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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Planning Committees (LEPCs).91 Both subchapters include the fol-
lowing forms that must be accessible to the public: emergency no-
tiªcation, material safety data sheets, an emergency and hazardous 
chemical inventory, and toxic chemical release forms.92 Under EP-
CRA, emergency notiªcations must be sent by the owner of a facility 
to the LEPCs impacted by the release of an extremely hazardous sub-
stance.93 Individual citizens do not need to be contacted by a facility 
owner.94 The notice should include the chemical name, an indication 
of whether the substance is extremely hazardous as deªned by EP-
CRA, the estimated quantity of the release, the time and duration of 
the release, the medium or media into which the release occurred, 
known acute or chronic health risks associated with the emergency, 
advice regarding medical attention, proper precautions to take as a 
result of the release, and a contact for further information.95
 Owners and operators of facilities are required under EPCRA to 
have available a material safety data sheet and emergency and haz-
ardous chemical inventory for chemicals considered hazardous under 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).96 Both forms must 
be submitted to the LEPC, SERC, and the ªre department with juris-
diction over the facility.97 Chemicals below a threshold amount, usu-
ally 10,000 pounds, may be excluded from the material safety data 
sheet.98 The material safety data sheet must contain a list of hazardous 
chemicals, grouped by category of health and physical hazards as set 
forth by OSHA, and the hazardous components of the chemicals.99
 Facility owners may choose to submit a federal tier I or tier II 
emergency and hazardous chemical inventory form, unless the SERC, 
LEPC, or ªre department requests a tier II.100 Most of the forms sub-
                                                                                                                      
91 42 U.S.C. § 11001. 
92 Id. §§ 11001–11023; Kathryn E. Durham-Hammer, Left to Wonder: Reevaluating, Re-
forming, and Implementing the Emergency Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 29 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 
323, 330–31 (2004). 
93 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(1). 
94 Id. § 11004. A release covers almost any type of spill, escape, or leaching into the en-
vironment. Id. § 11049(8). The environment is deªned broadly as including “water, air, 
and land.” Id. § 11049(2). 
95 Id. § 11004(b)(2). 
96 Id. §§ 11021(a)(1), 11022(a)(1). 
97 Id. §§ 11021(a)(1), 11022(a)(1). 
98 Id. § 11021; James M. Kuszaj, The EPCRA Compliance Manual: Interpreting 
and Implementing the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 
1986 at T6–1 (1997). 
99 42 U.S.C. § 11021. 
100 Id. § 11022; Kuszaj, supra note 98, §§ 7.02, 7.05–.06. 
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mitted are tier II forms.101 Both tier I and tier II forms require report-
ing of estimated ranges of the maximum amount of hazardous 
chemicals present during the preceding year, and of the daily amount 
of hazardous chemicals released.102 Tier I forms allow this informa-
tion to be reported in aggregate terms with hazardous chemicals 
grouped by OSHA categories of health and physical hazards.103 A tier 
II form is more speciªc and requires reporting for each hazardous 
chemical, including its chemical name and a brief description of the 
manner of storage.104 While tier I forms require disclosure of the gen-
eral location of each category of chemical, tier II forms require re-
porting of each chemical’s speciªc location.105 Facility owners ªling a 
tier II form, however, may elect to withhold the location of the haz-
ardous material from the public.106
 The toxic chemical release form differs signiªcantly from the 
other forms because it is submitted directly to EPA and any desig-
nated state agency.107 The toxic chemical release form only needs to 
be available to the SERC, LEPR, and the local ªre department.108 In 
addition, the toxic chemicals reported are not “hazardous chemicals” 
under OSHA, but a separate list under EPCRA.109 EPCRA requires 
reporting of over 300 hazardous chemicals.110
 Unlike the other reporting sections in EPCRA, the toxic chemical 
release reporting section only applies to owners and operators of fa-
cilities in speciªed industries that employ more than ten full-time 
employees.111 Approximately 6000 facilities in these industries—such 
as power generation, hazardous waste disposal, and petroleum whole-
sale—must ªle reports.112 The toxic chemical release forms include 
the name, location, and principal business activities of the facility, how 
the chemical is used, an estimate of the maximum amount present at 
the facility throughout the year, a description of the efªciency of the 
                                                                                                                      
101 Kuszaj, supra note 98, § 7.04. 
102 42 U.S.C. § 11022(d). 
103 Id. § 11022(d)(1)(A). 
104 Id. § 11022(d)(2). 
105 Id. § 11022. 
106 Id. § 11022(d)(2)(F). 
107 Id. §§ 11004, 11021, 11022, 11023; Kuszaj, supra note 98, at ªg.2-2. 
108 42 U.S.C. § 11023; see Kuszaj, supra note 98, at ªg.2-2. 
109 See 42 U.S.C. § 11023(c). 
110 Susan E. Dudley, It Is Time to Reevaluate the Toxic Release Inventory, 12 Mo. Envtl. L. 
& Pol’y Rev. 1, 1 (2004). 
111 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b). 
112 Dudley, supra note 110, at 1–2. 
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disposal process, and the annual quantity of toxins entering the envi-
ronment.113
A. EPCRA’s Public Availability Section 
 EPCRA explicitly states that all four forms and the emergency re-
sponse plan must be available to the general public.114 The information 
must be available during normal working hours at locations designated 
by the appropriate government entity.115 An explicit exclusion from 
public review exists for the speciªc location of chemicals as designated 
on a tier II form and conªdential or trade secret information.116
 EPCRA states that the toxic chemical release forms were in-
tended to be available to “citizens of communities surrounding cov-
ered facilities.”117 This intent manifests through the requirement that 
the forms be available “to inform persons about releases of toxic 
chemicals to the environment; to assist governmental agencies, re-
searchers, and other persons in the conduct of research and data 
gathering . . . .”118 Congress has also evidenced its intent to make the 
forms accessible to the public by requiring that the available data be 
accessible via computer telecommunications and other means.119 The 
TRI database compiles data collected under EPCRA and is currently 
available on EPA’s website.120
B. EPCRA and Preemption 
 EPCRA includes a non-preemption clause that explicitly states 
that the federal government is not preempting state and local meas-
ures.121 Section 110041 of EPCRA states that nothing in the chapter 
shall “preempt any State or local law.”122 While EPRCA requires that 
data sheets include information identical to the federal form, a state 
or locality can require the submission of additional information.123 
                                                                                                                      
113 42 U.S.C. § 11023(g). 
114 Id. § 11044(a). 
115 Id. Appropriate entities include LEPCs and EPA. Id. 
116 Id. §§ 11044(a), 11042. This Note will not address trade secrets. 
117 Id. § 11023(h). 
118 Id. 
119 42 U.S.C. § 11023(j). 
120 Id.; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, TRI Explorer, http://www.epa.gov/ 
triexplorer/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2006) [hereinafter U.S. EPA, TRI Explorer]. 
121 42 U.S.C. § 11041. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. § 11041(b). 
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For example, in Ohio Chamber of Commerce v. State Emergency Response 
Commission, the SERC adopted rules pursuant to the Commission’s 
outlined role in EPCRA.124 These rules required owners and opera-
tors of regulated facilities to submit scaled maps indicating the loca-
tion of chemicals.125
 The court in Ohio Chamber of Commerce addressed whether these 
rules exceeded the Commission’s authority.126 Opponents to the rule 
argued that EPCRA intended that the required forms be “‘consistent 
with and equivalent in scope, content, and coverage’” with the federal 
form.127 The Commission interpreted EPCRA as a “ºoor” —or mini-
mum reporting requirement—that not only allows more stringent 
regulations to be passed by the state, but anticipates that states will 
expand upon the federal requirements.128 The court ruled that the 
federal statute explicitly rules out preemption and allows states to cre-
ate their own form, thus demonstrating that the federal law was cre-
ated as a comprehensive law leaving room for additional state inter-
vention.129 In addition, the court believed the State Emergency 
Response Commission rule to be consistent with the stated federal 
purpose “to provide the public with information concerning hazard-
ous chemicals in their communities and to encourage and support 
emergency planning efforts at state and local levels.”130
IV. Risks and Beneªts of Disclosing Chemical  
Facility Information 
A. The Risk of a Chemical Attack 
 The risk of a hazardous substance release from a facility triggered 
by terrorist activities is considered to be low.131 Of the 353 known or 
suspected terrorists acts in the United States perpetrated from 1980 to 
2000, only a few involved chemical facilities, and as of 2000 there had 
yet to be a criminally caused chemical release from a facility in the 
United States.132 Yet the Department of Justice (DOJ) considers the 
                                                                                                                      
124 Id. § 11001; 597 N.E.2d 487, 488–89 (Ohio 1992). 
125 Ohio Chamber of Commerce, 597 N.E.2d at 489. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3750.02(B)(1)). 
128 Id. at 490–91. 
129 See id. at 490. 
130 Id. 
131 Linda-Jo Schierow, Chemical Plant Security 14 (Cong. Research Serv. 2005). 
132 Id. at 2; DEP’T of Justice, supra note 56, at 27. 
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possibility of an attack a “real and credible” risk based on the increas-
ing number of terrorist attacks against other targets and the risk of 
mass damage to life and property.133 Estimates as to the severity of a 
chemical release vary depending on whether a ºammable or hazard-
ous chemical release occurs, with estimates of the median number of 
persons impacted ranging from 15 to 1500.134
 Another reason that the threat is considered real and credible is 
the international history of using chemical facilities as weapons.135 
Outside of the U.S., multiple groups across the globe have utilized 
intentional chemical releases from industrial facilities as weapons.136 
For example, during the war in Croatia, Serbian forces attacked a 
chemical plant producing fertilizer, and in Colombia, the Revolution-
ary Armed Forces of Colombia exploded a pesticide warehouse result-
ing in mass evacuations of the surrounding area.137
 It is believed that terrorists select a target facility based on criteria 
similar to that used by the U.S. military.138 The military’s approach is 
based on obtaining nine pieces of crucial information: knowledge of 
the facility’s existence, the chemicals present, the off-site consequences 
of a release, the facility’s security, the facility’s layout, the location of the 
chemicals, knowledge of mitigation measures to limit the damage, the 
facility’s emergency response plan, and the community’s emergency 
response plan.139
 Chemical plant attackers will likely try to attack a chemical facility 
at its most vulnerable point.140 Assessing the most vulnerable point re-
quires consideration of the security systems’ weaknesses and the operat-
ing or environmental conditions that would provide an advantage to 
the attacker.141 Security or protection systems include detection devices 
such as sensors, physical barriers that cause delays such as locks, strong 
security response action as demonstrated by the ability to communicate 
the threat and neutralize it, and mitigation factors including automatic 
                                                                                                                      
133 See Dep’t of Justice, supra note 56, at 2. 
134 James C. Belke, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Chemical Accident Risks in U.S. 
Industry—A Preliminary Analysis of Accident Risk Data from U.S. Hazardous 
Chemical Facilities 26 (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/pubs/stock 
holmpaper.pdf; Schierow, supra note 131, at 9. 
135 See DEP’T of Justice, supra note 56, at 2. 
136 See id. at 22–27. 
137 See id. at 23, 26. 
138 See id. at 38. 
139 See id. at 38–39. 
140 Nat’l Inst. of Justice, DEP’T of Justice, NCJ 195171, Special Report: A Method 
to Assess the Vulnerability of U.S. Chemical Facilities 20 (2002) [hereinafter NIJ]. 
141 Id. at 20–21. 
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shut-down mechanisms.142 Vulnerability can be determined by evaluat-
ing system features with the least protection, and by predicting the 
worst case scenario.143 Protection systems should also be examined as a 
whole to determine if there is balanced protection which ensures that 
an adversary cannot overcome protective measures with one single at-
tack method.144 A vulnerability assessment should also take into ac-
count advantages that an attacker may have, such as emergency condi-
tions, lack of personnel on site, and inclement weather.145
 Terrorists have demonstrated the ability to obtain information 
through both legal and illegal means.146 Terrorist groups have built a 
reputation for attracting and training members with the specialized 
operative skills likely required for implementing an attack.147 As Jo-
seph D. Jacobson—Judge Advocate then assigned to the Litigation 
Division of the Air Force Legal Services Agency—argued in an article 
entitled Safeguarding National Security Through Public Release of Environ-
mental Information: Moving the Debate to the Next Level, terrorists are 
likely to acquire needed information from raw data more readily than 
community groups due to their motivation and specialized knowl-
edge.148 The counterargument is that providing information online, 
such as the worst case scenario, creates “one-stop shopping” by provid-
ing terrorists with a majority of the information needed to select a 
target from anywhere in the world.149
                                                                                                                      
142 See id. at 16–17, 20. 
143 See id. at 20. 
144 Id. at 26. 
145 Id. at 21. 
146 Bagley, supra note 2, at 69. The author cites the al Qaeda Manual found in Manchester, 
England by the Metropolitan Police, who found the manual while searching an al Qaeda 
member’s home, and later translated and introduced it at an embassy bombing trial in New 
York. Id.; see al Qaeda Manual, beginning at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf. The 
manual states that eighty percent of the information needed comes from public sources 
such as newspapers, books, broadcasts, and jokes by everyday people. al Qaeda Manual, 
supra, at BM-80–82, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpart1_3.pdf. It then states 
that the other twenty percent can be procured through illegal means such as “[i]ndividuals 
who are recruited as either volunteers or because of other motives.” Id. at BM-82. 
147 The 9/11 Report: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, Executive Summary LXXXIV–LXXXV, 522–23 (2004); Bagley, supra note 2, 
at 69 (citing al Qaeda Manual, supra note 146 at BM-82). 
148 See Jacobson, supra note 48, at 387–91. 
149 See Internet Posting of Chemical “Worst Case” Scenarios: A Road Map for Terror-
ists: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Health and Environment and Oversight and 
Investigation of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 109th Cong. 16–17 (1999) (statement of 
Tom Bliley, Chairman, H. Comm. on Commerce); DEP’T of Justice, supra note 56, at 3. 
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B. The Role of Environmental Information in Public Participation 
 Public involvement in environmental enforcement is supported 
by three rationales: normative, instrumental, and substantive.150 The 
normative rationale is that communities have a right to know, and the 
ability to mitigate any negative effects from a chemical facility.151 The 
instrumental rationale argues that information disclosure improves 
environmental performance because of community response.152 This 
theory also supports the notion that decreasing hazardous wastes is 
one of the better options for reducing terrorist threats to chemical 
facilities.153 The substantive rationale is that information disclosure 
leads to the cooperation necessary to understand and solve environ-
mental problems.154 This theory can be applied to security concerns 
by advocating that information shared with the community leads to 
measures that reduce terrorist threats.155
 In 2003, EPA published a report identifying how TRI data is util-
ized by citizens, citizen groups, industry, investing groups, and gov-
ernment.156 The report explained that citizen groups have utilized the 
information to educate communities, identify environmental justice 
concerns, and to engage in direct negotiation for pollution reduc-
tions.157 For example, in July 2005, a community group in Pilsen, Illi-
nois, learned from TRI data that a nearby industry was one of the 
                                                                                                                      
150 Thomas C. Beierle, The Beneªts and Costs of Disclosing Information About Risks: What 
Do We Know About Right-to-Know?, 24 Risk Analysis 335, 336 (2004); Daniel J. Fiorino, Citi-
zen Participation and Environmental Risk: A Survey of Institutional Mechanisms, 15 Sci., Tech., 
& Hum. Values 226, 227–28 (1990). 
151 Beierle, supra note 150, at 336; see Fiorino, supra note 150, at 227–28. 
152 Beierle, supra note 150, at 336; see Envtl. Prot. Agency, How Are the Toxics Re-
lease Inventory Data Used?—Government, Business, Academic and Citizen Uses 3–
8 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/tri/ guide_docs/2003_datausepaper.pdf [here-
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153 See Johnson, supra note 53, at 141; Joseph A. Siegel, Terrorism and Environmental Law: 
Chemical Facility Site Security vs. Right-to-Know?, 9 Widener L. Symp. J. 339, 379–81 (2003). 
154 Beierle, supra note 150, at 336; Fiorino, supra note 150, at 227. 
155 See Bagley, supra note 2, at 90, 95–100; Beierle, supra note 150, at 336; Fiorino, supra 
note 150, at 227; Jacobson, supra note 48, at 394. 
156 See generally Toxic Release Data Use, supra note 152. 
157 Id. at 3–9; see also Mary Graham, Democracy by Disclosure: The Rise of Tech-
nopopulism 21–61 (2002) (tracing the history and impact of the TRI program on indus-
tries and democracy). 
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city’s largest polluters.158 With this information, they were able to gain 
the attention of city and state ofªcials and initiate negotiations be-
tween the EPA and the factory for reduced emissions.159
 The EPA website that allows citizens to search the TRI draws ap-
proximately 240,000 searches annually.160 The website allows access 
mainly to raw data, which is difªcult for citizen groups to utilize be-
cause it requires expert knowledge of the chemical in order to draw a 
conclusion about the potential health impacts.161 To reduce the 
difªculty citizens encounter when interpreting raw data, national or-
ganizations such as OMB Watch and Environmental Defense analyze 
the raw data and provide guidance on the health effects of particular 
toxins released in a geographic area.162 This interpreted data has at-
tracted twice as many participants; the Environmental Defense Fund’s 
“scorecard” website draws approximately half a million views per 
month.163
C. Levels of Disclosure 
 Information may be disclosed at a variety of levels.164 For exam-
ple, information may be disclosed only to government agencies and 
not the general public, such as the case with trade secrets under EP-
CRA.165 The next applicable level of disclosure is notiªcation only to 
                                                                                                                      
158 See Michael Hawthorne, EPA Cites Smelter Regulators in Pilsen over Lead but Regulators 
Say It Meets Most Laws, Chi. Trib., July 7, 2005, at C1; OMB Watch, TRI Success Stories, 
http://www.ombwatch.org/tricenter/TRIsuccess.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2006); Pilsen 
Environmental Rights and Reform Organization, July 2005 Reports on H. Kramer & Com-
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159 See Ill. Envtl. Prot. Agency, H. Kramer and Company: On-site and Off-site 
Soil Sampling (2005); Jack Bess, Clearing the Air in Pilsen, Conscious Choice, Jan. 2006, 
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160 OCA Data, 65 Fed. Reg. 24,834, 24,838 (Apr. 27, 2000). 
161 Id.; Durham-Hammer, supra note 92, at 345–46 (outlining possible mistakes citizens 
may make when attempting to interpret information). 
162 Working Group on Community Right-to-Know, My Environment, http://www.crtk. 
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bases); Environmental Defense, Scorecard Database, http://www.scorecard.org (last visited 
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163 OCA Data, 65 Fed. Reg. at 24,838. 
164 Beierle, supra note 150, at 337–38. 
165 See 42 U.S.C. § 11042 (2000); see also Christopher J. Lewis, Comment, When Is a 
Trade Secret Not So Secret? The Deªciencies of 40 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart B, 30 Envtl. L. 143, 163–
65 (2000) (detailing EPCRA regulations that require companies to justify trade secret 
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those affected, referred to as community disclosure.166 Community 
disclosure is implemented in the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 
when utility customers are provided with consumer reports.167 Finally, 
full disclosure occurs when information is made available to the gen-
eral public.168 Full disclosure, which derives from FOIA, is applicable 
to systems such as TRI reporting that allow citizens public access to 
government internet databases.169 According to Thomas C. Beierle, 
“[a]ll modern models of full disclosure involve the compilation of in-
formation into electronic databases that support comparison, rank-
ing, and tracking of facility performance.”170 The internet is consid-
ered a more effective means for disseminating information than 
traditional methods.171
 The ability to access information tends to be the greatest under 
full disclosure and progressively weaker with community and agency 
disclosure.172 Because of exemptions in FOIA, CIIA, EPCRA, and 
SDWA, speciªc environmental information provided to government 
agencies can be withheld from public disclosure.173 This suppression 
of information results in the government carrying the full burden of 
enforcement and mitigation of community risk.174 This government 
burden goes against the congressional intent of public participation 
and enforcement in the environmental law realm as demonstrated by 
citizen suits and disclosure provisions in environmental laws such as 
EPCRA, CAA, and the Clean Water Act (CWA).175
                                                                                                                      
166 See Beierle, supra note 150, at 337. 
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V. States Going Beyond the Federal Floor 
 While EPCRA contains a federal right-to-know provision, states in-
cluding California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New Jersey have imple-
mented additional reporting requirements.176 Some state right-to-know 
laws seek to enhance dissemination of information by notifying citizens 
directly, instead of through a State Emergency Response Commission 
(SERC) or Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), as allowed 
by EPCRA.177 This section advocates that the Illinois right-to-know law 
successfully relays information to the public because it embraces meth-
ods that have been successful at the state and federal level. 
A. The Beginning: New Jersey—Informing Citizens About Health  
Effects in Plain Language 
 New Jersey’s environmental surveys create an inventory of the haz-
ardous substances present, similar to EPCRA’s toxic chemical release 
forms and emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms.178 The 
surveys are available to the public when requested in writing and were 
available online prior to September 11, 2001.179 In addition to the in-
ventory, New Jersey’s Right-to-Know Act requires the State Department 
of Health to create health fact sheets for each regulated chemical.180 
The fact sheets are available online and summarize the health effects of 
the substance in an accessible form, including recommendations on 
how to reduce exposure in the workplace, acute and chronic health 
effects, cancer or reproductive hazards, suggested medical tests for 
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worker disclosure mandates, such as workplace surveys designed to facilitate the reporting 
of hazardous substances, have been preempted by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), but the environmental sections of the statute are still valid. Id. at 
593. For example, environmental surveys, fact sheets, and the public disclosure of this 
information are not preempted. Id. at 594–96. 
179 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:5A-5, -9; N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Pollution, Prevention & Com-
munity Right to Know, http://www.nj.gov/dep/opppc/crtk/info.html (last visited Dec. 26, 
2006); OMB Watch, Access to Government Information Post September 11th, http:// 
www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/213/1/1 (last visited Dec. 26, 2006). 
180 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:5A-4–5. 
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those with high exposure, and commonly asked questions.181 For ex-
ample, one of cadmium sulfate’s acute effects is eye irritation and a 
common question is “[i]f I have acute health effects, will I later get 
chronic health effects?”182 Although not available on the same form as 
the facility description, the fact sheet in conjunction with the reporting 
survey provides communities with health information in a user-friendly 
format that is beneªcial to the public.183
B. An Effective Miss—Agency, but Not Public, Disclosure: California’s 
Proposition 65 
 In 1986, California approved Proposition 65 as part of the state’s 
Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act.184 This act is hailed 
for encouraging agency disclosure, but criticized for failing to provide 
the general public with information about facilities in their area.185 
Proposition 65 requires a blanket warning before exposing individuals 
to a chemical known by the state to cause cancer or reproductive tox-
icity, and applies to consumer product, work, and environmental ex-
posures.186 For environmental exposures, the Proposition 65 warning 
must be clear and convey that the chemical in the area is known to 
cause reproductive toxicity or cancer.187 No additional information, 
such as the name of the chemical or its exact location, is necessary.188 
The notice may be posted in one of three manners: a sign in the area, 
a mailed notice, or a media announcement.189 Proposition 65 has 
been criticized for lacking critical health information such as the level 
                                                                                                                      
181 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:5A-4–5; N.J. Dep’t of Health and Senior Serv., Description of a 
Hazardous Substance Fact Sheet, http://www.state.nj.us/health/eoh/rtkweb/hsfsdesc.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2006). 
182 N.J. Dep’t of Health and Senior Serv., Hazardous Substance Fact Sheet: Cadmium Sul-
fate, http://www.state.nj.us/health/eoh/rtkweb/3073.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2006). 
183 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:5A-5; supra Part IV.B–C (supporting the assertion that in-
terpreted data is more effective than raw data, and internet access is more efªcient at dis-
seminating information than other methods). 
184 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25249.5–.13 (West 1999); Clifford Rechtschaffen, 
The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings under California’s Proposition 65, 4 Ecology L.Q. 
303, 305 (1996). 
185 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance 
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 Geo. L.J. 257, 346 (2001); Rechtschaffen, 
supra note 184, at 333–40. 
 186 See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25249.6; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 26, § 26-12601 
(2006). 
187 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25249.6; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 26, § 26-12601(d). 
188 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 26, § 22-12601(d). 
189 Id. § 22-12601(d)(1). 
130 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 34:107 
of risk and nature of exposure.190 In addition, because many compa-
nies utilize inconspicuous newspaper advertisements and sometimes 
do not identify the facility, it can be difªcult to determine which facil-
ity caused the exposure.191
 Proposition 65 differs signiªcantly from EPCRA’s TRI because it 
provides a blanket warning, lacks speciªc information, and does not 
produce a “stream of generally available and comparable perform-
ance data.”192 But, like EPCRA’s TRI, Proposition 65 is credited as re-
ducing pollution.193 Proposition 65’s success has been partly credited 
to an exemption possibility in the statute.194 The exemption allows 
regulated entities demonstrating that the exposure in question poses 
“no signiªcant risk” to avoid reporting.195 Professor Bradley C. Kark-
kainen explains that this exemption creates an incentive to provide 
the state with credible data to establish no signiªcant risk; thus creat-
ing a “rich ºow of toxicity and exposure data that has allowed the 
state to establish regulatory standards for dozens of pollutants, at a far 
faster pace than under conventional regulatory approaches.”196
C. Massachusetts’s Failed Attempt 
 The Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education Environmental 
Law Series presents a dim picture of the state’s right-to-know law, not-
ing that “enforcement is at best desultory” and that the Massachusetts 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) “has closed its Right-
to-Know ofªce.”197 The Massachusetts law requires citizens to have 
knowledge of an environmental harm before being guaranteed access 
to more information.198 The statute allows residents of the town or 
city where the facility is located to ªle a petition requesting an investi-
                                                                                                                      
190 Rechtschaffen, supra note 184, at 336. 
191 See id. at 333, 336. 
192 Karkkainen, supra note 185, at 347. 
193 See id. at 346–47 (noting Proposition 65’s ability to shift the information burden); 
Rechtschaffen, supra note 184, at 348 (discussing that the law is “greatly ºawed” but it has 
nonetheless been able to aid in pollution reduction). 
194 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25249.10; see Karkkainen, supra note 185, at 346. 
195 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25249.10. 
196 Karkkainen, supra note 185, at 346. 
197 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111F, § 18 (2004); Massachusetts Continuing Legal Edu-
cation, Massachusetts Environmental Law § 21.7.1 (Gregor I. McGregor ed., 1999 & 
Supp. 2002) [hereinafter MCLE]. Since the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Gade v. National 
Solid Wastes Management, it is assumed that OSHA preempts the sections of the Massachu-
setts statute that address workplace disclosure and education. See 505 U.S. 88, 99–100 
(1992); MCLE, supra, § 21.7.1. 
198 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111F, § 18. 
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gation of the facility with the municipal coordinator.199 The petition 
must set forth the grounds for believing that the public health is en-
dangered and provide any information which may assist the munici-
pality’s investigation.200 The decision to pursue an investigation is at 
the discretion of the municipal coordinator, with the possibility of re-
view by the DEP.201 DEP may, but is not obligated to, release material 
safety data sheets to the petitioner.202
 The statute mandates that the public keep conªdential any in-
formation disclosed by the state.203 Section 21(b) restrains disclosure 
of the information received by anyone not statutorily authorized.204 
This provision essentially prohibited community members from shar-
ing safety and health information with one another.205 In Lawlor v. 
Shannon, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
found the provision unconstitutional on its face; ªnding that the sec-
tion was an abridgement of protected speech in violation of the First 
Amendment.206 In its analysis, the court determined that the pro-
posed substantial government interest— “risk of sabotage or rob-
bery”—was unsubstantiated because the government offered no evi-
dence that such concerns were legitimate and that if such risks 
existed, other states with right-to-know laws, such as New Jersey, would 
already have experienced robbery or sabotage.207
D. Bringing Together the Beneªts and Avoiding Prior Pitfalls: Illinois 
 In response to concerns surrounding groundwater contamina-
tion that affected at least seven hundred homes, the Illinois state legis-
lature enacted a bill enhancing the state’s community right-to-know 
reporting requirements.208 The bill is described as “putting Illinois at 
the forefront of State-enacted environmental protection law” and 
                                                                                                                      
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. § 21(b). 
204 Mass. Gen. Laws c.111F, § 21(b). 
205 See id.; Lawlor v. Shannon, No. 86-2516-Mc, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15671, at *4 (D. 
Mass. Aug. 29, 1988). 
206 Lawlor, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15671, at *13, *15. 
207 Id. at *14–15. 
208 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/25d-3 (2005); Press Release, Ill. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Gov. 
Blagojevich Signs Landmark Environmental Law to Help Protect Families and Communities, 
Hold Polluters Accountable: Illinois Becomes Nation’s Leader on Community Right-to-Know 
Issues ( July 25, 2005), available at http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease. 
cfm?SubjectID=29&RecNum=4174 [hereinafter Illinois EPA News]. 
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“making Illinois the nation’s leader in ensuring communities’ right-to-
know about potentially dangerous local environmental threats.”209
 The new law requires that the Illinois Environmental Protection 
Agency (IEPA) notify property owners of any soil contamination that 
extended beyond a facility’s property boundaries and poses a threat of 
public exposure above a speciªed threshold.210 For ground water con-
tamination that poses a threat of public exposure, notice must be 
given to owners of the water systems and the properties affected.211 
Similarly, the Act requires notice when IEPA refers a situation for en-
forcement or performs an immediate removal.212 This notice must be 
given to property owners within 2500 feet, or a distance determined 
by IEPA, and to county ofªcials.213
 The act does not mandate the notiªcation method; rather, it 
states that the method required “shall be determined in consultation 
with members of the public and appropriate members of the regu-
lated community.”214 Suggested methods include personal notiªca-
tion, public meetings, signs, electronic notiªcation, and print me-
dia.215 The notiªcation may contain the name and address of the 
facility, the name of the contaminant released, a speciªcation of 
whether the contaminant was released or suspected of release, a brief 
description of the potential adverse health effects, recommendations 
that the impacted wells be tested, and contact information for a per-
son at IEPA.216 The law required IEPA to create an internet database 
of chemical facility information indexed and searchable by notiªca-
tion date, zip code, site or facility name, and geographic location.217 
The internet site must include copies of the notiªcation and link to 
                                                                                                                      
209 Jocelyn F. Cornbleet, The Illinois Environmental Right-to-Know Law: Advising Clients 
and Protecting Their Reputation in Our Communities, 18 J. of the DuPage County Bar Ass’n 
10, 10 (2005); Illinois EPA News, supra note 208. The majority of the reporting require-
ments became effective January 1, 2006. 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/25d-3. 
210 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/25d-3(a)(1). 
211 Id. at 5/25d-3(a)(2). 
212 Id. at 5/25d-3(b); Cornbleet, supra note 209, at 13. 
213 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/25d-3(b), (c). 
214 Id. at 5/25d-3(c). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. Reasonable notiªcation costs must be paid for by the potentially responsible 
party (PRP), but a PRP with an approved community relations plan may use their own 
agency-approved notiªcations in lieu of notiªcations written by IEPA. Id. at 5/25d-3(c)–
(d). 
217 Id. at 5/25d-51; Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, Search Right-to-Know No-
tiªcations, http://www.epa.state.il.us/right-to-know/search.faces (last visited Dec. 26, 2006) 
[hereinafter IEPA, Notiªcations]. 
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EPA databases containing similar information about releases in Illi-
nois.218
 Illinois’s right-to-know law requires a direct warning to the public 
and a description in plain language of the chemicals’ health effects; 
New Jersey, California, and Massachusetts laws, unlike that in Illinois, 
fail to include both of these elements.219 Illinois, like TRI, allows for 
easy comparisons between facilities by utilizing the most accessible 
medium of full public disclosure, the internet.220 In addition, there is 
no showing of public endangerment necessary to gain access to in-
formation, thus avoiding Massachusetts’s ºaw.221 Illinois law provides 
access that is useful to communities by utilizing the advantages seen in 
New Jersey and the federal TRI, but it may not spur the agency disclo-
sure seen in California because it has no exemption for facilities pos-
ing no signiªcant risk.222
VI. Navigating Preemption: Options and Boundaries  
for State Laws 
 While the debate continues on whether information disclosure 
should remain a local issue or be under federal control, states cur-
rently have the ability under the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution and EPCRA’s preemption clause to implement reporting and 
disclosure requirements that best complement the state’s goals.223 
This ability is not without limitations because a state law cannot con-
ºict with the federal law by making it physically impossible to comply 
with both, nor may it serve as a barrier to the federal law.224 The Criti-
cal Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (CIIA) and the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act (SDWA) are sources of possible federal preemption re-
garding the dissemination of information that identiªes the speciªc 
location of chemical facility infrastructure to the general public under 
a state’s full disclosure scheme.225
                                                                                                                      
218  415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/25d-5; see also IEPA, Notiªcations, supra note 217. 
219 See supra Parts V.A–C. 
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225 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000); 6 U.S.C. § 133 (2000 & Supp. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2 
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134 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 34:107 
 CIIA and EPCRA both contain clauses addressing a state’s ability 
to require disclosure of additional information.226 EPCRA explicitly 
states that it does not preempt the ªeld, thus maintaining an avenue 
for states to promulgate their own reporting requirements as done by 
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.227 CIIA, while pre-
empting states from requiring disclosure of voluntarily submitted in-
frastructure information, maintains that the information can be made 
available through legal means other than FOIA, ex parte communica-
tions, civil action without written consent, and state and local disclo-
sure of information or records laws.228 For example, the Maine Public 
Utilities Commission requires that maps of speciªed public utility in-
frastructure be ªled with the state.229 In a recent dispute, the Com-
mission dismissed AT&T’s argument that such information did not 
need to be submitted under CIIA by afªrming that CIIA “does not 
limit the ability of a state agency to obtain such information inde-
pendently.”230
 The SDWA excludes vulnerability assessments from public disclo-
sure.231 A state law requiring public disclosure of vulnerability assess-
ment information will likely be preempted by SDWA because it would 
be in direct conºict with the SDWA’s purpose to keep this informa-
tion from the public by exempting it from FOIA.232 While public ac-
cess to this information could aid safety by motivating communities to 
negotiate with facilities to improve safety and security measures, state 
legislation disclosing vulnerability assessments would likely directly 
conºict with the federal statute prohibiting disclosure.233
                                                                                                                      
 
226 6 U.S.C. § 133(c); 42 U.S.C. § 11041. 
227 42 U.S.C. § 11041; Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25249.5–.13 (West 1999); 415 
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C.F.R. pt. 29). 
229 State of Maine Public Utilities Commission, Order on Waiver, No. 2001-284, 1 (May 
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231 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
232 See id.; Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 99–100 (1992). 
233 See 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2; Gade, 505 U.S. at 99–100; Bagley, supra note 2, at 88–89 (argu-
ing for full public disclosure of benchmarks which indicate a vulnerability ranking for a 
speciªc facility in order to increase chemical plant safety). Similarly, facilities covered by 
the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 require vulnerability assessments for 
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 While many public disclosure laws concerning infrastructure in-
formation may be preempted, there is an opening for state legislation 
to make this information available to ªrst responders.234 Ohio Chamber 
of Commerce v. State Emergency Response Commission demonstrates the 
ability of states to require infrastructure information about the exact 
location of hazardous chemicals for purposes of preparing emergency 
responders, such as ªreªghters.235
 Despite a potential conºict with the dissemination of vulnerabil-
ity assessments and infrastructure information, requiring additional 
data reporting and providing readily interpretable information—such 
as health effects caused by a chemical—should not conºict with fed-
eral legislation.236 This information is not explicitly prohibited from 
public disclosure under CIIA, SDWA, or FOIA.237 Often, additional 
health information will advance the federal government’s goals, in-
cluding EPCRA’s purpose of providing the public with information 
concerning hazardous chemicals.238
VII. Determining What Information to Disclose 
 If states implement right-to-know laws, they will likely need to 
balance the public’s need for access to information against legitimate 
security concerns as seen in CAA, SDWA, and CIIA.239 This section 
suggests what information should be disclosed to the public, what in-
formation may need to be withheld, and what information may need 
to be disseminated in a manner that reduces risk, but maintains 
community access to the information. To provide insight into various 
manners of balancing security information with the community’s right-
to-know about hazardous chemicals, this section draws from DOJ’s 
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analysis of whether to disclose OCA data, techniques used for assess-
ing vulnerability, and legislators’ past decisions.240
A. Facility Names, Chemicals Present, Health Effects, and Emergency Release 
Information Should Be Publicly Disclosed 
 The facility name, chemicals present, accident history, health ef-
fects of the chemicals, and emergency release notiªcations should be 
accessible to the public because the information poses a low security 
risk and provides a community beneªt. The risk is low because many 
facility names and a description of the chemicals stored are currently 
available through EPCRA’s TRI.241 In addition, basic chemical facility 
information for many chemicals, not just those covered by TRI, can 
be found through other sources such as trade organization publica-
tions, company and professional organization websites, and telephone 
books.242 While the argument remains that this information is part of 
the analysis for selecting a chemical facility for attack, these are only 
two of the nine criteria needed, and neither of the two adds substan-
tive information that aids in identifying a facility’s greatest vulnerabili-
ties.243 As noted by the U.S. District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts, similar information has been available in New Jersey for 
decades and has not resulted in an attack.244
 Disclosure of chemical facility identities and the chemicals pre-
sent therein poses a security risk, but is essential to all theories under-
lying public disclosure.245 Without knowing the facility responsible for 
a release, communities are impeded from negotiations to mitigate the 
facility’s negative effects.246 Massachusetts and California are exam-
ples of state reporting laws that do not include public disclosure of 
                                                                                                                      
240 See generally DEP’T of Justice, supra note 56; NIJ, supra note 140; supra Parts II, V 
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the individual chemical facility names.247 The use of anonymous 
newspaper advertisements under Proposition 65 has been criticized as 
not providing the information that citizens need to reduce hazards.248 
The Massachusetts right-to-know law requires a citizen to establish 
grounds for asserting that a facility poses a risk to the community.249 
This standard may be why the law has had unsatisfactory results.250 
State regulations that require facilities to identify themselves—and the 
chemicals they possess—can avoid the faults of California and Massa-
chusetts legislation, while not creating additional security risks.251
 Because of information available in the public realm, augment-
ing the list of chemicals reported should not pose a security threat 
and would provide a beneªt by imposing market pressure to decrease 
the use of harmful chemicals.252 Similarly, lowering TRI reporting 
may decrease the security risk by lowering the quantities of hazardous 
chemicals used.253 Additionally, when the federal government pro-
posed to increase the threshold, it cited the burden of reporting, 
rather than any national security considerations, indicating that 
higher thresholds are not directly related to national security.254
 The accident history of a facility, the health consequences of the 
chemicals present, and notiªcation of releases should also be dis-
closed to the public.255 None of these items are speciªcally identiªed 
as among the criteria used to select a chemical facility as a potential 
target.256 The accident history has been available under CAA for 
years, and larger accidents are often reported by the media; thus ter-
rorist groups can acquire much of the information through alterna-
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tive means.257 Similarly, the health effects of a speciªc chemical can 
be researched independently through scientiªc journals or a simple 
Google search.258 In addition, despite the assessment of Off-Site Con-
sequence Analysis (OCA) by DOJ and the events of September 11, 
2001, the accident history reports remain easily accessible on the 
internet, indicating that public access to this material is not a security 
concern.259
 For citizens, having access to accident histories allows for compari-
sons with other facilities, and furthers their ability to persuade facilities 
to improve their environmental performance.260 The importance of 
informing citizens of health risks in plain language is demonstrated by 
SDWA’s consumer reports, New Jersey’s fact sheets, and Illinois’s right-
to-know law.261 Utilizing plain language is important because the public 
is more likely to be able to use interpreted information than raw 
data.262 Legislatures have deemed notiªcation of a release a necessary 
disclosure as indicated by SDWA’s consumer reports, Illinois’s notices, 
and EPCRA’s emergency notiªcation.263 Notiªcation of a chemical re-
lease has been the focus of legislation because people have an obvious 
interest in knowing whether a release will affect them or their prop-
erty.264 States should follow Illinois’s lead by requiring mailings or no-
tices to the individuals affected rather than only requiring a notice to 
the LEPC as allowed by EPCRA.265 Because of the seemingly limited 
security risk associated with this information and the beneªt provided 
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to citizens, this information should be fully disclosed to the public, ide-
ally through an internet-accessible database.266
B. Chemicals’ Locations and Facility Layouts Should Be Disclosed to 
Emergency Personnel but Not to the Public 
 Information regarding facility layout and the location of chemicals 
within a plant poses a higher security risk and provides minimal com-
munity beneªt.267 This information is critical for attacking a plant and 
identifying the facility’s vulnerabilities.268 A facility layout may indicate 
barriers to entry that are a factor in determining the vulnerability of an 
area.269 Similarly, the location of the chemical, in conjunction with in-
formation about a barrier, would allow for identiªcation of the chemi-
cal that would cause the most damage with the least amount of ef-
fort.270 The sensitive nature of this information is also reºected in the 
option to remove speciªc location information from public disclosure 
under EPCRA’s tier II form.271 This factor may also have been a consid-
eration for New Jersey when it removed its Community Right-to-Know 
surveys—which identiªed the location of the chemicals—from the 
internet.272
 Despite a potential security risk, this more sensitive information 
must be disclosed to emergency personnel.273 The case Ohio Chamber 
of Commerce v. State Emergency Response Commission centered on emer-
gency response personnel obtaining a map of the facility with the 
chemicals’ locations identiªed.274 The Ohio Fire Chiefs’ Association’s 
brief of amicus curiae advocated that the requirement of a map or site 
plan depicting the locations of hazardous chemicals is necessary to 
effectively plan for a chemical emergency.275 The amicus brief de-
scribed the need for the map as “critical to averting loss of life or 
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property.”276 EPCRA accounts for emergency personnel needs by 
granting them access to location information contained on tier II 
forms even if the facility chooses not to disclose the information to 
the general public.277 Emergency responder advocates claim that the 
thresholds for reporting are too high and that information regarding 
all chemical storage should be reported.278 This claim suggests a need 
for state legislation providing full information to emergency person-
nel at lower thresholds than EPCRA requires.279
C. Speciªc Security Measures and Vulnerability Assessments Should  
Not Be Publicly Disclosed 
 Speciªc facility security measures and vulnerability assessments 
including this information should not be disclosed; this information 
is critical to planning an attack at a facility and helps to identify the 
most vulnerable locations.280 This information was not previously 
available through other reporting requirements—such as EPCRA or 
CAA—and would likely be difªcult to access through other means.281 
Legislatures have repeatedly attempted to keep this information from 
public disclosure.282 Federal legislation requiring vulnerability assess-
ments such as CIIA, SDWA, and the Maritime Transportation Security 
Act include FOIA exemptions, thus potentially preempting state regu-
lations requiring full disclosure of this information for facilities with 
voluntarily submitted critical infrastructure information, or regulated 
by SDWA or Marine Transportation Act.283
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D. Vulnerability Zone Information Should Be Disclosed but in a Manner That 
Reduces the Risk of Illicit Use 
 Knowledge of the vulnerability zone is a critical element for identi-
fying a target, but also involves strong public disclosure interests.284 The 
OCA data reported under CAA 112(r) posed similar equities that were 
resolved by maintaining access to some of the information while reduc-
ing its risk of illicit use; similar solutions may be useful at the state level, 
maintaining access to speciªc hazardous chemical information while 
reducing the risk of “one-stop shopping” for terrorists and others.285
 Maps of the vulnerability zone and the information necessary to 
create a map were cited as the highest risk information contained in 
OCA data.286 Community disclosure is one method utilized with OCA 
data that states could use to inform the public while reducing a security 
risk.287 Community disclosure reduces “one-stop shopping” because it is 
more difªcult to compare facilities over a large geographic range from 
anywhere in the world.288 Although community disclosure may prevent 
comparative analysis, if other information such as accident history and 
a chemical inventory are accessible via the internet, communities can 
still compare data and negotiate with chemical facilities.289
 Community disclosure can be implemented by utilizing a com-
puter program such as the Vulnerable Zone Indicator System (VZIS) 
or SDWA’s consumer reports.290 Community disclosure should seek to 
notify persons living within a vulnerability zone and inform them 
about the potential health effects of the chemicals stored and the fa-
cility’s safety record.291 Providing interpretable information to citizens 
would reduce the information chase that EPA’s electronic mail initi-
ates by not identifying the source of the risk, and avoid the bar of hav-
ing to know about a danger in order to receive more information as 
Massachusetts requires.292 Thus the form would mimic that used by 
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Illinois to alert people within an area that could be affected by a re-
lease.293
Conclusion 
 Inºuenced by private sector concerns, TRI threshold require-
ments are being increased, and federal legislation concerning chemi-
cal facility security is constantly proposed and rejected.294 In this ever-
changing atmosphere, states maintain the ability to supplement EP-
CRA and maintain or enhance the dissemination of information to 
communities. With TRI being heralded as an effective method of de-
creasing toxics, state efforts at maintaining tough public disclosure 
requirements may continue to ensure safer facilities. By requiring in-
formation that is beneªcial to local communities while respecting le-
gitimate security concerns, states can reduce the hazards present and 
decrease chemical facilities’ attractiveness as terrorist targets. 
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